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1 Introduction
In reaction to the problematic increase of global trade disputes, India recently
expressed its reluctance to see certain ‘‘Non Trade Concerns’’ (NTC), including
labour and the environment, introduced in the World Trade Organisation (WTO)’s
purview. According to India’s Commerce Secretary indeed, developing nations are
facing a double challenge when dealing with the WTO dispute settlement system: a
lack of internal capacity to tackle complex technical issues such as trade remedies,
and the progressive inclusion of labour and environment related decisions, settled in
other forums, in the reasoning of the WTO’s adjudicators.1,2 This perspective is
unfortunately not uncommon as it echoes other developing countries approaches to
international trade law and, at the same time, contributes to the artificial
fragmentation of international law, which has characterized the past 20 years.3
While developing and, to a lesser extent, emerging economies have traditionally
associated their global attractiveness to a rather loose normative framework of
protection for labour and the environment hence creating a comparative advantage
in trade, these disastrous views for a sound and sustainable development have only
but been reinforced by the technicalization and strategic division of international
law in many sub-disciplines eventually read in isolation to meet short term policy
objectives. Lex specialis (specialized law), ‘‘self-contained’’ regimes, and region-
alism have indeed been advanced as many explanations of the current international
law complication while, at the same time, jus cogens, ‘‘systemic integration’’ and
repeated incantations to refer to the Article 31 (3) (c) of the Vienna Convention of
the Law of Treaties4 (VCLT) are supposed to provide drafters and judges with
solutions in favour of a pluralistic and integrative vision of international law as well
as the integration of Non Trade Concerns in trade law.5
What are these controversial ‘‘Non Trade Concerns’’ about? Virtually anything
and everything if not defined rigorously. In a trade in agriculture context, the NTC
appeared in relation to the interpretation of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture
(AoA), which is said to be flexible enough to provide for the protection of food
1 On India’s willingness and challenges to build up trade capacity, see James J. Nedumpara, WTO, State,
and Legal Capacity Building: An Indian Narrative, in LEI¨LA CHOUKROUNE, JUDGING THE STATE IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW (2016).
2 See Non trade Issues at the WTO: Lack of Capacity Worries India, THE HINDU, May, 3 2016, http://
www.thehindu.com/business/Economy/nontrade-issues-at-wto-lack-of-legal-experts-worry-india/
article8548230.ece.
3 On fragmentation, see International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, A/CN.4/L.682, 2006. See also
MARGARET YOUNG, REGIME INTERACTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: FACING FRAGMENTATION (2012); OLE
KRISTIAN FAUCHALD & ANDREAS NOLLKAEMPER, THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL COURTS AND
THE (DE-)FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2014); on the methodological challenge in international
economic law, see Ernst Ulrich Petersmann, Methodological Pluralism and Its Critics in International
Economic Law Research, 15(4) J. INT’L ECON. L. 921–970 (2013).
4 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, A/CN.4/L.682, Article 31(2).
5 Id.
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security, rural development, poverty alleviation, and the environment.6 In this
context, the ‘‘multi-functionality’’ of agriculture already addressed by the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in its March
1998 Communique´,7 has been stressed by the WTO itself in the preamble of the
Agreement on Agriculture:
commitments under the reform programme should be made in an
equitable way among all Members, having regard to Non Trade Concerns,
including food security and the need to protect the environment; having regard
to the agreement that special and differential treatment for developing
countries is an integral element of the negotiations, and taking into account the
possible negative effects of the implementation of the reform programme on
least-developed and net food-importing developing countries.
This apparently simple reasoning has nevertheless generated numerous heated
debates from the early years of the WTO.8 The absence of a clear definition of what
could be a NTC contributed to the confusion and developing countries fears to see
their trade policies impeded by externally imposed ‘‘western’’ values and standards.
This again revealed a rather short-term vision, but remains largely prevalent in
today’s discussions. In addition, recent cases such as the ‘‘seal dispute’’ have
reactivated the debate on the basis of the interpretation of Article XX (General
Exceptions) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994) and the
protection of public morals (Article XX (a)) and indigenous communities (Inuit)
rights in particular.9 Yet no consensus could be achieved in treaty drafting or case
law on the very coverage of NTC.
Having this in mind, one can wonder what could then be ‘‘Non Investment
Concerns’’ (NIC) while the expression has not yet gained much popularity in
international investment practice and scholarship. Such a definition would require a
genuine theoretical construction going beyond the limited borders of this short
article, but for the clarity of the discussion, the following elements will be
6 See WTO, ‘Non-trade’ Concerns: Agriculture Can Serve Many Purposes, https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd17_agri_e.htm.
7 See OECD, Ministerial Communique´s Related to Agricultural Policies, http://www.oecd.org/tad/
agricultural-policies/ministerialcommuniquesrelatedtoagriculturalpolicies.htm#mar98.
8 These include academic debates on NTC as reminded by Laurence Boisson de Chazournes in a recent
article honouring the scholarship of Professor Jackson. See Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, WTO and
Non-Trade Issues: Inside-Out, 19 J, INT’L ECON. L., 379–381 (2016); for an investment related perspective
on environmental aspects: see Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Environmental Protection and
Investment Arbitration: Yin and Yang?, COLUM. J. INT’L. L. (2016) (forthcoming).
9 See Appellate Body Report., European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and
Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS400/AB/R (May 22, 2014), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/cases_e/ds400_e.htm. In this case, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s finding that the EU
Seal Regime is ‘‘necessary to protect public morals’’ within the meaning of Article XX(a) of the GATT
1994, but that the European Union had not justified the EU Seal Regime under Article XX and in fact
applied its exception in a discriminatory manner inconsistent with the GATT and the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). On interpreting the WTO agreements and developments in inter-
pretation of the Article XX, see Joel Trachtman The WTO Seal Products Case: Doctrinal and Normative
Confusion, AM. J. INT’L L. (2015), https://www.asil.org/blogs/wto-seal-products-case-doctrinal-and-
normative-confusion.
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considered as falling under NIC: the right to regulate—despite its many and
problematic meanings—human rights, development, labour, corporate social
responsibility (CSR), the environment and anti-corruption. While certainly subjec-
tive, this list is based on today’s most recurring treaty practices responding, even
timidly, to pressing ‘‘societal’’ challenges treaty drafters and adjudicators do not yet
dare to formulate in a rights and precisely human rights language.
Based on a variety of previous researches on India (and emerging countries) and
international trade and investment law, this article reviews India’s International
Investment Agreements (IIAs) including its Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT)
models in the light of Non Investment Concerns (NIC) and the integration—or
not—of related measures (I).10 In doing so, it shows the importance of a right-based
approach in a changing international context (II) and concludes in favour of a
greater and original integration of NIC in India’s current negotiations and treaty
drafting.
2 Non Investment Concerns in Indian International Investment
Agreements
In early 2013, India decided to suspend all its BITs negotiations to eventually
publicly release a first new BIT model draft, which has largely been commented
since the beginning of 2015.11 This did not come as a complete surprise as India is
facing, for the past 5 years or so, a growing number of investors’ claims (around
seventeen according to certain estimates).12,13 Some of these disputes, and the
landmark decision on the White Industries case to start with, have literally produced
a landslide of comments and interrogations on the direction to be given to India’s
investment policy with regard to some essential aspects of its autonomy to regulate
economic activities including its tax policy.14 With eighty four BITs and thirteen
other Treaties with Investment Provisions (TIPs) (either concluded or under
10 See in particular LEI¨LA CHOUKROUNE, EMERGING COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT
LAW (2016); Leı¨la Choukroune, Human Rights in International Investment Disputes: Global Litigation as
International Law Re-Unifier, in JUDGING THE STATE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW (Leı¨la
Choukroune, 2016); Leila Choukroune, Disasters and International Trade and Investment Law—the
State’s Regulatory Autonomy between Risk Protection and Exception Justification, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON DISASTERS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (S. Breau &, K. L. H. Samuel, 2016); Leila Choukroune,
The Liberalization of Water and Sanitation Services in International Trade and Investment Law: for a
Holistic (Human) Rights Based Approach, in THE REGULATION OF THE GLOBAL WATER SERVICES MARKET
(Julien Chaisse, 2016); Leila Choukroune, Indian and Chinese FDI in Developing Asia: the Standards
Battle Beyond Trade, 7 THE INDIAN J. INT’L ECON. L., 89–116 (2015).
11 Draft Indian Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Text, Government of India, https://mygov.in/group-
issue/draft-indian-model-bilateral-investment-treaty-text/.
12 See Puja Mehra & Suhasini Haidar, India-U.S. Investment Protection Pact in the Offing, THE HINDU,
JUL. 21, 2105, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indiaus-investment-protection-pact-in-theoffing/
article7444730.ece?homepage=true.
13 Some of these cases are identifiable on the Investment Treaty Arbitration Website.
14 We will further develop the White Industry case’s impact on the Most Favoured Nation (MFN)
standard of treatment below. See White Industries Australia Limited v. The Republic of India,
UNCITRAL Arbitration, Final Award (November 30th, 2011).
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negotiation), India has been at the forefront of treaty negotiations for the past three
decades.15 Interestingly, the changing nature of its trade from a rather closed
socialist economy to more liberal and internationalized paradigms as much as its
recent encounters with international investment arbitration have impacted India’s
perceptions of the best possible treaty.
Although a relatively late entrant on the BIT scene with a first treaty signed with
the UK in 1994, India has progressively crafted a very large number of treaties with
developed and developing countries all over the world. While it restricted itself to BIT
until 2004, it then entered into regional negotiations and FTA with countries such as
Japan, Korea and Malaysia (see the Appendix tables) and there are many more to
come at the bilateral or mega-regional level. Interestingly, India took an opposite
stance to, for example, China as far as National Treatment and Most Favoured
Nations (MFN) are concerned. While it generally granted the two standards of
treatment [as well as Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET)] in most of its 1990s and
2000s treaties, its recent attempts show a real suspicion of the MFN. This, of course,
is a direct result of its recent—and first condemnation by an arbitral tribunal in the
White Industries case. While based on the India-Australia BIT, the broad interpre-
tation of the MFN standard by the investment tribunal resulted in finding that the
standard of ‘‘effective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights’’ could be found
in the India-Kuwait BIT.16 It then concluded that: ‘‘the Republic of India has breached
its obligation to provide effective means of asserting and enforcing rights’’ with
respect to the White Industries Australia Limited’s investment pursuant to the article
4(2) of the BIT incorporating the Article 4(5) of the India Kuwait BIT.17 For these
reasons, and as seen in many other relatively similar (tax related) cases that are
underway, the Indian government decided to review its BIT policy including its BIT
model. The 2015 model hence does not mention the MFN standard, which may pose
problem for Indian investors going global.18
2.1 India’s BITs models and practices
As far as NIC are concerned, the 2003 and 2015 BIT models offer a different
approach. Short and investment friendly, the 2003 model visibly aimed at economic
efficacy: how to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) in an era of liberalization.
There is in fact no genuine provision related to NIC. The BITs concluded with
India’s partners in the early 2000s are hence noted for their brevity and absence of
15 See Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (BIPA), Ministry of Finance,
Government of India, http://finmin.nic.in/bipa/bipa_index.asp; Trade Agreements, Ministry of Commerce
and Industry, Government of India, http://commerce.nic.in/trade/international_ta.asp?id=2&trade=i.
16 Article 4(5) of the India-Kuwait BIT provided that: ‘‘Each party shall… provide effective means of
asserting claims and enforcing rights with regard to investments…’’. Each Contracting State shall
maintain a favourable environment for investments in its territory by investors of the other Contracting
State. Each Contracting State shall in accordance with its applicable laws and regulations provide
effective means of MFN.
17 White Industries Australia Limited, supra note 14, at } 16.1.1.
18 On the recent developments and pros and cons of an MFN insertion, see Prabhash Rajan, Most
Favoured Nation Provisions in India BIT, A Case For Reform, 55 (1) INDIAN J. INT’L L. 39–64 (2015).
Jindal Global Law Review (2016) 7(2):157–174 161
123
NIC related provisions. In the early 2000s, while a number of investment disputes
were already questioning the State’s right to regulate in favour of the public interest,
the gap in India’s practice is quite striking and has later become problematic when
disputes have arisen.
On the other hand, and as a reaction, the 2015 model BIT offers quite a number
of NIC related provisions, which counterbalance the criticism often formulated
since its adoption.19 A curious instrument indeed, at the intersection of various
approaches of investment law (liberal and statist), the 2015 model BIT somehow
contradicts other political ambitions of the current government and the ‘‘Make in
India’’ campaign. The model BIT does not always provide a protective and
attractive environment for FDI while, at the same time, it does not necessarily
protect the interests of the State and its population. The debateable new provisions
include : the stricter definition of investment, the complete exclusion of taxation, the
absence of an MFN provision and the curiously drafted dispute settlement
provisions, which requires the exhaustion of local remedies by the investor before it
can proceed to international arbitration, i.e. quite a challenging task in a country
where the number of pending cases is infamous. These provisions also have to be
taken into consideration for Indian investors ‘‘going global’’ as they are now offered
less protection than in the past. However, as briefly indicated above, the NIC related
provisions deserve particular attention. They are identifiable in the following
sections: Preamble (Sustainable development and right to regulate), Article 9 (Entry
and Sojourn of Personnel), Article 10 (Transparency), Article 11 (Compliance with
Law), Article 12 (Corporate Social Responsibility including labour, human rights,
environment and anti-corruption standards), Article 32 (General Exceptions) and
Article 33 (Security Exceptions and Appendix 1 related).
The preamble sets the tone in reaffirming the ‘‘[r]ight of [p]arties to regulate
investments in their territory in accordance with their law and policy objectives’’.20
Directly related to individual rights protection, the Article 9 (Entry and Sojourn of
Personnel) and Article 10 (Transparency) have to be read in relation to today’s
evolution of trade and investment and increasing expectations in terms of freedom
of movement and access to information although the latest is well framed by certain
other imperatives (Article 10.4):
Nothing in this Treaty shall require a Party to furnish or allow access to
confidential information, the disclosure of which would impede law enforce-
ment, or otherwise be contrary to the public interest, or which would prejudice
legitimate commercial interests of particular juridical persons, public or
private.
Article 11 (Compliance with Law) and Article 12 (CSR including labour, human
rights, environment and anti-corruption standards) can be read together as far as
19 For well-argued and constructive criticism, see Analysis of the 2014 Draft Model Indian Bilateral
Investment Treaty: Report No. 260, LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, Aug. 2015.
20 Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, Dec.
28, 2015, http://finmin.nic.in/the_ministry/dept_eco_affairs/investment_division/ModelBIT_Annex.pdf;
See Draft Indian Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Text, Government of India, https://mygov.in/group-
issue/draft-indian-model-bilateral-investment-treaty-text/.
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anti-corruption measures are concerned. Here again, they correspond to contem-
porary evolutions and the greater public demand in favour of political and economic
accountability. Article 12 is however of particular interest knowing India’s recent
moves in favour of the implementation of sound CSR policies and the 2013 change
in company law which requires businesses with annual revenues of more than ten
billion Rupees to give away two percent of their net profit to charity, putting India at
the forefront of CSR:
Investors and their enterprises operating within the erritory of each Party shall
endeavour to voluntarily incorporate internationally recognized standards of
corporate social responsibility in their practices and internal policies, such as
statements of principle that have been endorsed or are supported by the
Parties. These principles may address issues such as labour, the environment,
human rights, community relations and anti-corruption.
The direct references to human rights is of particular importance although a
language of rights in the nature of a precise binding instrument is still absent.
In addition, Article 32 (General Exceptions) and Article 33 (Security Exceptions
and Appendix 1 related), largely modelled on WTO exceptions, could prove useful
in dispute settlement and help contribute to de-fragmentation of international law.
The sceptics would, of course, argue that their implementation could be complicated
in an investment context.
2.2 Indian Treaties with Investment Provisions (TIPs)
As if anticipating this new trend, previous TIPs had already paved the way for
further NIC measures being integrated. Amongst them a few deserve special
attention.21 The 2005 India-Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation
Agreement (CECA) set the tone of the developments to come. Its preamble
reaffirms the ‘‘right to pursue economic philosophies suited to development goals
and right to regulate activities to realize national policy objectives’’ and recognizes
that:
‘‘economic and trade liberalization should allow for the optimal use of natural
resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development,
seeking both to protect and preserve the environment.’’
In addition, the chapter 6 (investment) comprises public interest related measures
(right to regulate, Article 6.10) as well as WTO type ‘‘general exceptions’’ (Article
6.11).
The 2010 India-Korea CEPA follows the same path and interestingly integrates
an original Article 10.16 on ‘‘health, safety and environmental measures’’:
1. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting,
maintaining or enforcing any measure consistent with this Agreement that is in
21 See annexes for a synthetic approach to the provisions included.
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the public interest, such as measures to meet health, safety or environmental
concerns.
2. The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by
relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures. Accordingly, a
Party should not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or
otherwise derogate from, such measures as an encouragement for the
establishment, acquisition, expansion or retention in its territory of an
investment of an investor. If a Party considers that the other Party has offered
such an encouragement, it may request consultations with the other Party and
the Parties shall consult with a view to avoiding any such encouragement.
The 2011 CECA with Malaysia allows for measures on public interest and on
‘‘environmental measures’’:
Each Party recognizes that it is inappropriate to encourage investment
activities in its Area of investors of the other Party by relaxing its
environmental measures. To this effect each Party should not waive or
otherwise derogate from such environmental measures as an encouragement
for establishment, acquisition or expansion of investment.
Lastly, the recently negotiated (2014) India-ASEAN Investment Agreement
contains a large number of NIC measures. For example, it includes: Preamble
(Special and differential treatment (SDT) and Development), Article 3 and 4 and 5
(Reservation List on National Treatment and Review of the same), Article 16 (SDT
for newer members), Article 21 (General Exceptions), Article 22 (Security
Exceptions and Appendices 1 and 2 related).
While engaging in multilateral negotiations including trade and investment issues
with developed and developing countries, India will certainly benefit from a larger
and more comprehensive inclusion of NIC measures in its current BITs and other
IIAs and eventually the adoption of a (human) rights based approach.
2.3 The right time for a right (s) based approach
2.3.1 A fast changing international landscape
With 3,304 International Investment Agreements (IIAs) and almost 600 FTAs the
production of economic norms for global and regional integration has reached an
unprecedented stage.22 In addition, international investment law and dispute
settlement is at the centre of this troubled environment and indeed constantly
evolving from a conceptual framework to a variety of other approaches, which may
apparently refer to the same standards but greatly differ in putting forward different
policy objectives and economic development paths.23 Investor-state dispute
22 See World Investment Report 2015—Reforming International Investment Governance, UNCTAD,
http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=1245 [hereinafter UNCTAD World
Investment Report].
23 See R. ECHANDI & P. SAUVE, PROSPECTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY: WORLD
TRADE FORUM (2013).
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settlement has radically changed. While the number of disputes has exploded with
seventy new cases introduced in 2015 (i.e. highest number of cases in a year), and
bringing the total number of known treaty based cases to six hundred and ninety six,
the geographical representation as well as the nature of the cases have dramatically
evolved.24 As far as countries targeted by investment arbitrations are concerned, an
important evolution is under way. With 40 % of new cases initiated against
developed countries, the relative share of cases against these countries has been on
the rise (compared to the historical average of 28 %). This has already impacted the
discussion on investment arbitration including the EU’s reluctance to introduce
investment arbitration provisions in the agreements its currently negotiating and the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). As far as the nature of
disputes is concerned, investors do not hesitate anymore to target host countries
regulatory activity in challenging national policies for health, the environment or
energy production and security.25,26 In addition, the latest rendered awards have
reached astronomical sums with a 2014 award amounting to USD fifty billion in the
Yukos three closely related cases27—the highest known award by far in investment
arbitration.
During the same period, in 2014, Asia became, for the first time, the world’s
largest investor region (with USD four hundred and forty billion outward FDI),
hence overtaking North America (with USD three hundred and ninety billion) and
Europe (with USD two hundred and eighty six billion).28 China and India have
played a large part in this massive expansion with Hong Kong becoming the second
largest investor in the world behind the US, and FDI outflows from India increasing
fivefold to USD twelve billion in 2014.29 This concrete realization of Narendra
Modi’s ‘‘Act East’’ and China ‘‘good neighbour’’ policies heralds tremendous new
developments for the world. Beyond trade statistics and other investment flows,
there is now another lengthier and deeper struggle which is that of political
redefinition of the rules governing global economics. In this regard, as demonstrated
above, India and China have taken a rather heterodox path, which might appear for
many as an alternative to ‘‘western rules’’.30 This international law, which they
hardly had a hand in creating, has not reduced their normative autonomy. On the
contrary, they have seized on it to strengthen their powers and create—if not yet
24 See UNCTAD World Investment Report, supra note 22.
25 See World Investment Report 2014-Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan, UNCATD, http://unctad.
org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=937.
26 See Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: in Search of a Roadmap, UNCTAD, IIA Issues Note,
No. 3, (June 2013).
27 See Hulley Enterprises Limited former Yukos Oil Company in the ISDS proceedings against the
Russian Federation: Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, Permanent Court of
Arbitration, Award, (18th July, 2014), Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation,
UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. AA 227, Award 18 July 2014, Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v. The
Russion Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. AA 228, Award, 18 July 2014.
28 Investment Trends Monitor, No.19, UNCTAD, (May 18, 2015), http://unctad.org/en/
PublicationsLibrary/webdiaeia2015d2_en.pdf.
29 Id.
30 LEI¨LA CHOUKROUNE, EMERGING COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW (2016).
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export—a sui generis model mixed with norms imported and reinterpreted in light
of creative practices embedded in contrasting histories and political regimes. This
heterodox strategy eventually gave space for regulatory autonomy and gradual
economic liberalization in supporting the development of national champions. As
some of these national champions go ‘‘global’’, the national treatment standard of
protection may be important.31
Lastly, in relation to NIC, a few newly drafted treaties have taken into account
the civil society’s concerns and the need for human rights-related provisions
integration and clarification. While timid and sometimes not even using the term
‘‘human rights’’ nor referring to precise provisions, these attempts are real and
deserve to be put into perspective. Two are of particular interest, one being more
politically daring and legally rigorous than the other: the Comprehensive Economic
and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada and the Transpacific
Trade Partnership (TPP) between the United States and eleven Pacific countries, a
group representing 40 % of the world GDP.32 The CETA negotiators have clearly
offered an attentive ear to civil society’s criticism echoed by the EU Parliament.33
What has been called in diplomatic, yet very curious terms, ‘‘a legal scrubbing’’ to
‘‘fine tune’’ the treaty in response to civil society pressure, eventually led to the
publication of a new treaty in late February 2016.34 At the core of this ‘‘fine tuning’’
are investment provisions and investment dispute settlement reforms in relation to
the massive criticism and concerns following the publication of the first CETA draft
at a time European countries are also targeted by investment arbitration, a new
reality which came as a shock for government and public opinions discovering that
Europe was also fallible and the ISDS system was not only made to sue developing
countries.35 A look into the text of the treaty is disappointing: while a number of
provisions are indeed supporting states sovereignty and so their ability to protect
their citizens’ rights, human rights are certainly not at the core of the treaty text
despite some references found in the preamble to the ‘‘Universal Declaration of
Human Rights’’ and the importance of ‘‘international security, democracy, human
rights and the rule of law for the development of international trade and economic
cooperation’’.36 Unfortunately again, the treaty drafters use the vague language of
31 See M. Sornarajah, India, China and Foreign Investment, in CHINA, INDIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORDER 132–166 (SORNARAJAH & WANG, eds., 2010).
32 For official presentations, see European Commission, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
(CETA), http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/[hereinafter CETA]. The TTP countries are Aus-
tralia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore,
United States and Vietnam.
33 For a synthesis of EU Parliament concerns and initiatives and positions, see European Parliament,
EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, (Jan. 2016), http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/573929/EPRS_BRI(2016)573929_EN.pdf.
34 For the EU comments at the time, see: European Commission, CETA: EU and Canada Agree on New
Approach on Investment in Trade Agreement, (Feb., 2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.
cfm?id=1468.
35 See UNCTAD World Investment Report, supra note 22 (the introduction above and generally the
latest UNCTAD reports which show a surge in European countries related investment cases with
countries like the Chez Republic or Ukraine topping the list of respondents).
36 See, CETA, supra note 32.
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the parties ‘‘right to regulate within their territories’’ to ‘‘achieve legitimate policy
objectives, such as public health, safety, environment, public morals and the
promotion and protection of cultural diversity’’, but nothing clear and binding is
further elaborated as to the same parties’ human rights obligations. In this regard,
and despite the absence of the term ‘‘human rights’’ in the more than 5000 pages of
the treaty text, the TPP is politically daring and legally rigorous. Politically daring
indeed, when confronted to a negotiation process with extremely varied countries,
many of which are not democratic and not deliberately supporting an ambitious
international human rights agenda; and legally rigorous as some provisions of the
TPP are better defined than equivalent provisions of the CETA with clear references
to labour or environmental legal instruments and commitments.37
2.3.2 The need for a renewed approach of NIC through standards and rights
The progressive integration of certain standards of treatment is revealing of the
flexibilities of international law. To understand the possibilities offered by a
creative approach, one has to bear in mind the revolutionary nature of certain
standards and, for instance, a national treatment directly impacting regulatory
autonomy of the State and domestic constitution. Granting national treatment to
foreigners can indeed be seen as a profound contribution towards universalism
by means of a concrete adherence to international law, but it can also be
interpreted as too intrusive a standard that a State is not able to adhere to in
view of its economic development or the lack of reciprocity its nationals may de
facto face in the absence of either corresponding foreign regulations or
economic capacity to trade and invest abroad. So there is reluctance by many, in
views of political and pragmatic considerations to take such a fundamental turn
in their approach to opening up and globalization. Now widely accepted, the
national treatment standard is present, at the post-entry stage, in all Indian FTAs
and IIAs, coupled (or not) with other investment standards and the MFN and
FET standards in particular. Pre-entry national treatment provisions modelled on
US practice are not generalized because many countries and emerging countries
in particular, are resisting its introduction to protect their regulatory autonomy.
While of a limited nature in the 1990s BITs, exceptions are often introduced in
the new IIAs that firmly support investment liberalization. India should make a
greater use of these. Of various types and nature, these exceptions can be
general (public health, order, moral, security) and influenced (or not) by Article
XX of the GATT. They can also be country specific to protect nationals against
foreign investment in certain economic fields (infant industry, strategic
economic sectors such as the cultural industry) or target specific domains for
exemption of national treatment (intellectual property, prudential measures,
financial services, etc.). The qualifications/exceptions to the national treatment
serve to balance the legal symmetry sometimes artificially created by the
37 On the TPP negotiations, see Leı¨la Choukroune, Le Partenariat Transpacifique Precurseur De
Nouveaux Traite´s Commerciaux, LE MONDE, Oct. 7, 2015, http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2015/
10/07/le-partenariat-transpacifique-precurseur-d-une-nouvelle-generation-de-mega-traites-commerciaux_
4784436_3232.html.
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national treatment standard with the economic asymmetries resulting from a de
facto dominance from one partner’s powerful multinational companies over the
other partner’s economy. Thus the national treatment standard effectively
induces and supports a sovereign to develop itself through an autonomous
regulatory project. In addition, a smart and efficient use of regulatory flexibilities
could reconcile different approaches in trade and investment law. In this regard,
a positive reconsideration of the national treatment standard by India and the
many possibilities it offers to enhance State sovereignty in their economic
choices would contribute to the very objective of a regulated trade and
investment liberalization—a globalization, beneficial to all.
India can now use its own investment model integrating NIC for the benefit of its
population through a (human) rights approach. This of course, will reveal
challenging, as human rights are generally not taken into consideration in
international investment law and dispute settlement. Whether it is the unwillingness
of treaty drafters to incorporate human rights provisions often perceived as counter-
productive to foreign direct investment (FDI) reception or the reluctance of
arbitrators to go beyond the letter of the law and interpret agreements in conjunction
with general international law norms and principles, the debate has occupied legal
scholars for some time while civil society was fighting for these rights to be directly
addressed by the international investment regime.38,39 This current tedious debate
has largely been fuelled by political and economic interests rather than convincing
legal arguments.40 Interestingly, the apparent contradiction between norms could
indeed be easily resolved through political and economic will to read the law from a
holistic perspective making use of its many flexibilities.41 Why would it be essential
to now integrate human rights in treaty drafting? Because they are directly invoked
in dispute settlement and the issues addressed are related. In this regard, the recent
Novartis case42 clearly stresses the relations between investment and public choices
and the need to legislate to improve public health. In the context of a series of
amendments to the Indian Patents Act, which took effect on 1 January 2005, India
indeed adopted Section 3(d). This controversial reform de facto limited
38 In this regard, please see one of the first comprehensive publication on the topic, released after a
number of investment human rights–related disputes took place: PIERRE-MARIE DUPUY, ET AL., HUMAN
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION (2009). For an updated analysis on the same
essential issues, see Vivian Kube & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights Law in International
Investment Arbitration, EUI, Department of Law Working Paper No. 2016/02.
39 Amnesty International, Human Rights Trade and Investment Matter, 2006, https://www.amnestyusa.
org/sites/default/files/pdfs/hrtradeinvestmentmatters.pdf.
40 On the relation between international investment law and international law and public law, see ERIC DE
BRADANDERE, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AS PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2016); STEPHEN SCHILL
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW (2010); ANDREAS KULICK, GLOBAL PUBLIC
INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (2014).
41 On a comparison with the absence of political will to take human rights consideration into account in
the Doha round of trade negotiation, see ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW IN THE
21ST CENTURY: CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM AND MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE OF INTERDEPENDENT PUBLIC GOODS
(2012).
42 See Novartis v. Union of India, Civil Appeal Nos. 2706-2716 of 2013, Supreme Court of
India[hereinafter Novartis].
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pharmaceutical companies’ ability to obtain ‘‘secondary patents’’ that is a patent
protecting an alternative structural form of a given molecule and hence protects
innovation only if it demonstrates enhanced ‘‘efficacy’’. On April 1, 2013, the
Supreme Court of India decided on an appeal made by the pharmaceutical giant
Novartis against a rejection of a patent application by the Indian Patent Office. The
court’s decision was essentially based on a clarification of Section 3(d) and the
concept of ‘‘therapeutic efficacy’’ while, at the same time, affirming compliance
with the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS).43 Hence the court argued that the Parliament had to produce, ‘‘within a
very limited time, an Act that would be TRIPS compliant without, in any way,
compromising on public health considerations’’.44 It is important to recall here that
India was at the forefront of the negotiation of the WTO Ministerial Declaration on
TRIPS and Public Health adopted in Doha in 2001 and affirming that:
the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from taking
measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our
commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can
and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO
Members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to
medicines for all.45
As to the interpretation of ‘‘therapeutic efficacy’’, the court demonstrated that:
Efficacy means ‘‘the ability to produce a desired or intended result’’. Hence, the test
of efficacy in the context of section 3(d) would be different, depending upon the
result the product under consideration is desired or intended to produce. In other
words, the test of efficacy would depend upon the function, utility or the purpose of
the product under consideration. Therefore, in the case of a medicine that claims to
cure a disease, the test of efficacy can only be ‘‘therapeutic efficacy’’.46
Technically complex and based on an equally long procedure, the text of the
judgment is very well argued and scientifically grounded. It raises the issue of
rewarding genuine innovation involving therapeutic efficacy and at the same time,
dealing with major public health challenges for the State. The case has made the
headlines and received massive criticism47 but it is a genuine contribution made by
an emerging country.
43 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 320
(1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994).
44 See Novartis, supra note 42, at }76 (India).
45 See Doha Declaration WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/2, 14B November 2001, http://www.who.int/medicines/
areas/policy/tripshealth.pdf?ua=1.
46 See Novartis, supra note 42, } 179.
47 See in this regard Prof. Abbott measured interpretation which contrasts with more technical and
market oriented reading of the same provisions from the TRIPS to the idea of efficacy and the related
concept of ‘‘evergreen’’: Dorothy Du, Novartis Ag v. Union of India: ‘‘Evergreening,’’ Trips, and
‘‘Enhanced Efficacy’’ Under Section 3(d), 21 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 223 (2014).
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3 Conclusion
A (human) rights-based approach directly tackling NIC appears as the only logical
path to address all other international law issues. Not only does it encompass
essential human rights principles, but it also proves an effective tool to international
law reunification and coherent application from treaty drafting to dispute resolution
while putting an end to the debate on the definition and categorization of NIC. As
applied to investment (and trade), it places the discussion in another perspective,
that of legal entitlements, rights holders can claim against the state and other non-
state actors.
Hence, instead of a passive defensive approach resisting the exportation of
‘‘western’’ norms and standards, it is worth pondering why emerging economies such
as India have not adopted a proactive and creative strategy in defining the essential
norms and standards applicable to their companies’ operations abroad or for the
protection of their own interests and populations.48 Low standards will only weaken
the economic capacity of emerging and developing countries in great need for growth
and jobs creation. It is ample time to integrate NIC in investment treaty drafting and to
adopt a creative approach to standards definitions based on (human) rights. Amongst
these, the conservation of natural resources, the betterment of working conditions or
the health and safety of consumers should obviously matter to India.
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Appendix 1: Indian IIAs and Non Investment Concerns
Indian BITs Partners Date of entry
into force
Status Non investment
measure(s)
2003 BIT Model Terminated X
2015 BIT Model In force Preamble (Sustainable development and
right to regulate)
Article 9 (Entry and Sojourn of Personnel)
Article 10 (Transparency)
Article 11 (Compliance with Law)
Article 12 (Corporate Social Responsibility
including labour, human rights,
environment and anti-corruption
standards)
Article 32 (General Exceptions)
48 As a striking example, a recent report from the Swiss NGO shows that European oil companies and
commodity traders are exploiting weak fuel standards in African countries to export highly polluting fuels
that they could not sell in Europe or the US where standards of protection are higher: See Alice Ross,
Trafigura, Vitol and BP Exporting Dirty Diesel to Africa, Says Swiss NGO, THE GUARDIAN, Sep. 15, 2016.
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Indian
BITs
Partners Date of entry
into force
Status Non investment
measure(s)
Article 33 (Security Exceptions
and Appendix 1 related)
Asia and Middle East
1 Armenia 30/05/2006 In force x
2 Australia 01/03/2001 In force x
3 Bahrain 05/12/2007 In force x
Bangladesh 07/07/2011 In force x
Brunei Darussalam 18/01/2009 In force x
4 China 01/08/2007 In force x
5 Indonesia 22/01/2004 In force x
6 Israel 8/02/1997 In force x
7 Jordan 22/01/2009 In force x
8 Kazakhstan 26/07/2001 In force x
9 Korea 07/05/1996 In force x
10 Kuwait 8/06/2003 In force x
11 Kyrgyzstan 12/05/2000 In force x
12 Laos 05/01/2003 In force x
13 Malaysia 12/04/1997 In force x
14 Mongolia 29/04/2002 In force x
15 Myanmar 08/02/2009 In force x
16 Nepal Signed21/10/
2011
Not in
force
x
17 Oman 13/10/2000 In force x
18 Philippines 29/01/2001 In force x
19 Qatar 15/12/1999 In force x
20 Saudi Arabia 20/05/2008 In force x
21 Sri Lanka 13/02/1998 In force x
22 Syria 22/01/2009 In force x
23 Tajikistan 14/11/2003 In force x
24 Taiwan 28/11/2002 In force x
25 Thailand 13/07/2001 In force x
26 Turkey 18/10/2007 In force x
27 Turkmenistan 27/02/2006 In force x
28 United Arab Emirates 21/08/2014 In force x
29 Uzbekistan 28/07/2000 in force x
30 Vietnam 01/12/1999 in force x
31 Yemen 10/02/2004 in force x
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Indian BITs Partners Date of entry
into force
Status Non investment
measure(s)
Europe
1 Austria 01/03/2001 In force x
2 Belarus 23/11/2003 in force x
3 BLEU (Belgium-Luxembour
Economic Union)
08/01/2001 In force
4 Bosnia Herzegovina 13/02/2008 In force x
5 Bulgaria 23/09/1999 In force x
6 Croatia 19/01/2002 In force x
7 Cyprus 12/01/2004 In force x
8 Czech Republic 06/02/1998 In force x
9 Denmark 28/08/1996 In force
10 Finland 09/04/2003 In force x
11 France 17/05/2000 In force x
12 Germany 13/07/1998 In force x
13 Greece 10/04/2008 In force x
14 Hungary 02/01/2006 In force x
15 Iceland 2008 In force x
16 Italy 26/03/1998 In force x
17 Latvia 27/11/2010 In force x
18 Lithuania 01/12/2011 In force x
19 Macedonia 17/11/2008 In force x
20 Montenegro Signed 31/01/2003 Not in force x
21 Netherlands 01/12/1996 In force x
22 Poland 31/12/1997 In force x
23 Portugal 19/07/2002 In force x
24 Romania 09/12/1999 In force x
25 Russian federation 05/08/1996 In force x
26 Serbia 24/02/2009 In force x
27 Slovakia 27/09/2007 In force x
28 Slovenia Signed in 14/06/2011 Not in force x
29 Spain 15/12/1998 In force x
30 Sweden 01/04/2001 In force x
31 Switzerland 16/02/2000 In force x
32 Ukraine 12/08/2003 In force x
33 United Kingdom 06/01/1995 In force x
Africa (14)
1 Congo, Democratic Republic Signed 13/04/2010 Not in force x
172 Jindal Global Law Review (2016) 7(2):157–174
123
Appendix 2: Treaties with Investment Provisions (TIPs)
Indian BITs Partners Date of entry
into force
Status Non investment
measure(s)
2 Djibouti Signed 19/05/2003 Not in force x
3 Egypt 22/11/2000 In force x
4 Ethiopia Signed 05/07/2007 Not in force x
5 Ghana Signed 05/08/2010 Not in force x
6 Libya 23/03/2009 In force x
7 Mauritius 20/06/2000 In force x
8 Morocco 22/02/2001 In force x
9 Mozambique 23/09/2009 In force x
10 Senegal 17/10/2009 In force x
11 Seychelles Signed 02/06/2010 Not in force x
12 Sudan 18/10/2010 In force x
13 Trinidad and Tobago 07/10/2007 In force x
14 Zimbabwe Signed 10/02/1999 Not in force x
Americas
1 Argentina 12/08/2002 Terminated x
2 Colombia 03/07/20113 In force x
3 Mexico 23/02/2008 In force x
4 Trinidad and Tobago 07/10/2007 In force x
5 Uruguay Signed 17/02/2008 Not in force x
Indian TIPs Parties Date of
entry into
force
Status Non investment measure(s)
ASEAN-India
Investment
Agreement
ASEAN Signed
12/11/
2014
Not in
force
Preamble (SDT and Development)
Article 3 and 4 and 5 (Reservation List on
National Treatment and Review of the
same)
Article 16 (SDT for newer members)
Article 21 (General Exceptions)
Article 22 (Security Exceptions and
Appendices 1 and 2 related)
India-Malaysia
FTA
Malaysia 07/01/2011 In
force
Preamble (Right to regulate)
Chapter 10 (Investments)
Article 10.20 (Measures in the Public Interest)
India-Japan EPA Japan 01/08/2011 In
force
Preamble (Right to regulate)
Chapter 8 (Investment) Article 99
(Environmental Measures)
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Indian TIPs Parties Date of entry
into force
Status Non investment measure(s)
India-Korea
CEPA
Korea 01/01/2010 In
force
Preamble (Right to regulate,
sustainable development and
environment, regulatory
cooperation)
Chapter 10 (Investment) Article
10.16. (Health, Safety and
Environmental Measures)
India
Singapore
CECA
Singapore 01/08/2005 Preamble (Right to regulate, natural
resources and environment
protection)
Chapter 6 (Investment), Article 6.10
(Measures in the public interest)
Article 6.11 (General Exceptions)
India-Chile
Framework
Agreement
Chile Signed
20/01/
2005
Not in
force
India-GCC
Cooperation
Framework
Gulf Cooperation
Council
Signed
25/08/
2004
Not in
force
India-ASEAN
Framework
Agreement
01/07/2004 In
force
BIMSTEC
Framework
Agreement
Bangladesh, India,
Myanmar, Sri
Lanka Thailand
30/06/2004 In
force
X
SAFTA 01/01/2006 In
force
India-Thailand
Framework
Agreement
Signed
09/10/
2003
Not in
force
EC-India
Cooperation
Agreement
EU 01/08/1994 In
force
Preamble (Right to own economic
path and protection of the poor
populations)
RCEP In
negotiation
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